Summary
This paper introduces endogenous adoption costs for productive assets in a Ramsey type growth model with international capita L flows. There are two cIasses of productive assets: owner-specific and location-specific. Adoption costs are an increasing function of the leve! of technology embodied in the investor's owner-specific assets and a declining function of the host country's loca tion-specific assets. In this setting the observed pattern of international capital flows is consistent with diminishing returns to capita!. Further, our mod el predicts the sectoral allocation of investment and output observed in the South. Capital does flow from rich to poor countries, but both stocks and flows are highly concentrated in a fewnewly industrialized countres. This investment pattem seems to be at odds with the neoclassical growth model which exhibits diminishing retus to capitaL. The neoclassical model predicts that the retum to capital is highest in relatively capital-poor countries, and as a consequence, capital should flow from rich to poor countries if it is intemationally mobile. However, empirical evidence suggests that the rate of retum to. capital is not higher in capital-poor than in capital-rich countres (World Ban, 1989; Bardhan, 1996) . This finding has induced a shift in research emphasis from imperfections in the intemational capital markets to analyses of what determines the rate of retum to capital, usually in the context of endogenous growth models.
There are two main strands of endogenous growth models which are concemed with the low rate of retum to capital in relatively capital-poor countries. Both concentrate on foreign directinvestment (Fni), and both explain the coexistence of relative capital scarcity and low retus to capital by the complementarty between intemationally mobile capital and another factor of production which is not intemationally mobile.
The first strand argues that the immobile, complementary factor of production is human capital (Uzawa, 1965; Lucas, 1988; 1990; Fafchamps, 1995; . I am grateful to Magnus Hatlebak, Kjell Eri Lommerud, Trond Olsen, Para Sen, Anthony
Venables, paricìpants at the Norwegian Economics Association's research conference in Oslo Januar 1999, and paricipants at the DEGIT conference in Tilburg, July 1999 for useful comments to this and a previous version of the paper. l Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Stokey 1996) . Poor countries are assumed to be in relatively short supply ofhuman capital, and relatively meager flows of Fni follòw.
The second strand argues that intermediate goods and services are non-tradable and complementary to capital. In ths literatue, productivity is determined by the degree of specialization, which in turn is determined by the extent of the market. Since small or poor countres have small markets, the degree of specialization is shallow, and the return to the primar factors of production is low as a consequence (Faini, 1984;  Rodriguez- Clare, 1996) . There is, however, little empirical evidence that intermediate goods and services are non-tradable. To the contrary, they constitute a significant and increasing share of world trade (WTO 1999) . Moreover, small countries tend to have a similar input-output strcture as larger countres, but the import share of intermediate goods and services is higher (Chenery et. aL., 1986) .
In this paper we build on the first strand by analyzing the impact of complementarities between classes of capital that differ with respect to international mobility. However, our model differs from previous research in four important ways. First, while previous papers typically assume that factors are either perfectly mobile between countries or they do not move across international boundares at all, we wish to analyze the more general case wlth imperfect international capital flows.
Second, we reinterpret the two types of capital to represent owner-specific and location-specific capital. Owner-specific capital refers to assets which firms have acquired through diverting resources from productive activities and which have a higher return when employed in this paricular firm than if employed elsewhere.
Assets such as technology, work organization, managerial systems, firm-specific skils and made-to-measure machinery and equipment fall into this category. Locationspecific capital refers to assets whichcan not easily be transported or transferred from one location to another, and which foreign investors consider exogenous when they take location decisions. The rule oflaw, contract enforcehient -including intellectual property rights, the generalievel of education and infrastrctue fall into the locationspecific assets category. Some ofthese assets have characteristics ofpublic goods and can be modeled as services from public investments.
By making the distinction between location-specific and owner-specific capital, we build on insights from industri al organization-based theories of Fnl. This literature sees Fni as a strategi c decision by individual companies on where to locate valueadding activities. Such decisions are drven by the urge to find the most efficient way of combining the firm's owner,.specific assets with the host countr's location-specific assets for each value-adding activity (nunning, 1993; UNCTAn, 1998) .1 This behavior translates into a maximization problem, which is the micro-foundation for the model developed in this paper. Through this reinterpretation we are able to focus sharlyon the capital mobility-dimension. In our context, human capital maý well be owner-specific and internationally mobile, while physical capital assets may be internationally immobile.
1 Even when location specific assets are combined with firm-specific assets of foreign companies, this does not necessarly result in FDI. Alternative arangements are joint ventures, licensing or simply selling owner-specific assets to foreign firms. In addition to fmding a profit maximizing combination of owner-specific and location-specific assets, there must also be benefits to combining these assets within the organization of a multinational fir. These aspects are discussed in Dunning (1993) and Third, as a consequence of our reinterpretation of the two types of capital, we maintain labor as a separate factor of production. This is necessary because human capital can be assumed to be embodied in workers, while location-specific capital can not. Labor is assumed to be in fixed supply. Finally and most significantly, .our model differs from former models regarding the nature of externalities related to location-specific capital accumulation. The externality in out model reduces the adoption cost of owner-specific capitaL. The existence of such adoption costs is indicated in several studies. ne Long and Summers (1991) forexample, find that the real relative cost of capital goods seems to be particularly high in developing countres. We argue that it is reasonable to assume that adoption costs increase with the degree of sophistication of the asset in which investment is made, and decline with the stock of location-specific assets in the host countr, hence the externality. By are very high. The next section of the paper presents the model, while section 3 draws some policy implications and concludes. Markusen (1995) , the latter within a static modeling framework. The benefits of internalization are,
The model
A Ramsey-type growth model with two types of accumulated assets is developed.
The two types of assets are owner-specific, denoted K, and location-specific, denoted G. Factor income can be spent on consumer goods or saved, while savings are invested in G or K, the latter at home or abroad. A world with a fixed common stock of technology in the form of n blueprints is presupposed. Each blueprint represents a technology which firms may transform into owner-specific assets. Such assets are ranked according to the amount of technology embodied in them. The aggregate stock of K in the economy is therefore given by: n K = ¿Ä!K¡ (1) and is the sum of technology-adjusted assets defined by a quantity parameter K¡ and a quality parameter, Â!, Â:; 1. A cost of transforming each blueprint into productive assets is incurred by firms and increases with the level of sophistication of the technology. Assume that quality O is a standardized asset that can be bought off the shelf. Next, the owner-specific assets are adopted to the location-specific assets in a particular country. The cost of doing so is assumed to decline with the per capita stock of location-specific assets in the host countr. It is common in endogenous growt models to assume that productivity in individual firms depends on the total stock of capital rather than the per capita stock. The argument behind this is that capital accumulation induces the accumulation of knowledge that is non-rival and however difficult to incorporate in a growth mode!, and we abstraet from it here. non-excludable. It is therefore the total stock rather than the per capita stock that matters for knowledge spilovers. Unfortately, this yields a scale effect in the rate of growth, which appears to beat odds with empirical evidence.2
We argue that accumulation of location-speeific assets sueh as a high level of education, good infrastreture and good institutions is subject to externalities that reduces the cost of adopting sophisticated technology to a particular location, but that there are congestion effects as well. In addition, location-specific assets include land and natual resources, which are clearly subject to congestion or diminishing returns.
By making the adoption eost dependent on the per capita stock of loeation-specific assets we incorporate the eongestion effect and avoid the scaleeffect on growth rates.
The adoption eost function reads:
We restrict the parameter values such that (1-a-;jl a -o 1.3 This ensures that the cost reduction effect of an additional unit of per capita location-specific assets is diminishing. Equation (2) has a proven empirical foundation when location-specific assets are limited to human capital. Several studies have included the log of initial Gnl times the stock of human capital, represented by the level of education and the life expectancy, in growth regressions in order to capture the interaction between Gnl and human capitaL. It is assumed that a higher level ofhuman capital raises the ability 2 See for example Jones (1995) for a discussion. 3 This implies that the share of factor income that accrues to "raw labor" is smaller than the share the accrues to owner-specific assets.
to absorb new technologies and therefore speeds up the convergence process. As expected, the interaction varable is found to be inversely related to real growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) . Equation (2) introduces adoption costs proportional to the complexity of the production process, and inversely proportional to the accumulated stock of locationspecific assets per worker. By so doing it captures the empirical relationship found in Barro and Sala-i-Marin (1995) , provided that our broader definition of locationspecific assets has a similar effect as the more narow definition ofhuman capital. As a consequence of (2) and the fact that countres have different endowments of location-specific assets, adoption costs differ among countres. Adoption costs are assumed to be of the iceberg type which means that one unt of savings is transformed to 1/ Ci .. 1 units of owner-specific assets of quality i. The stock of effective capital of quality i employedin the economy is therefore given by:
Firmj produces final goods subject to the production function:
or in terms of output per worker:
where Y is total output of final goods or factor income. With this specification, varieties of the owner-specific assets are not direct substitutes or complements to each other, but we note that location-specific assets and owner-specific assets are complementary. The formulation is similar to Grossman and Helpman (1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Marin (1995) . We do not explain advances in technology, but take the number of ideas or blueprints as given. We follow the two previous papers and assume that for each asset, the state of the art version is adopted. We do, however, make the additional assumption that assets can be ranked according to productivity or quality. For example, ifthe accumulated investment in organizational assets and firmspecific ~owledge are the same, the marginal productivity of investment in organizational assets may be higher than the marginal productivity of firm-specific knowledge.
The production fuction (4) exhibits constait returns to scale. Using (1) For each individual firm that takes g as a given parameter, the production function is stil standard Cobb-nouglas with constant returns to scale in Gj, ~, and Lj. Let us now turn to the investment-decision of firms. Assume that savings or financial assets are allocated among the countries of the world such that they earn the same rate of return everyhere. The stock of quality i invested and employed is thus determined by the profit maximizatiön problem given the world market interest rate, which, applying (5) yields: k. . = ral'-a g~ g1-a-r ißa I(r + t5l/ (1-a) l,) ~ ) (6) Equation (6) yieldsthe following distrbution of investment on quality rungs of capital in firmj:
k . = ral'-a g~ g1-a-r Jinßa I(r + t5l/(1-a) = k .
The distrbution of investment on owner-specific assets is ilustrated by figure 2.1. increases with the quality of the asset. Note that the small er the stock of locationspecific assets employed by the firm, the small er the total amount of nominal investment, and the larger is the proportion of nominal investment that is spent on adopting owner-specific assets to the production process in the company. However, the distribution of effective investment on the quality rungs in terms of percentages of total effective investment is the same whatever the level of location-specific assets.
We have now shown how savings that are invested by a company are transformed into owner-specific assets and adopted to the location-specific assets in a chosen location.
This discussion relates to investment decisions in general, not necessarily foreign investment. In the next section we wil analyze foreign investment withn the framework of a growth model for an economy open to international capital flows. In order to do so, we need to interpret the model in terms of Fni and we need to aggregate the production function into one macro production function.
Equilbrium growth with capital mobilty, market solution
In this section we derive the growth rate for a market economy open to international capital flows. Location-specific assets are now interpreted as the internationally immobil e assets of a country, as indicated in the introductory section. Owner-specific assets are interpreted as the assets that multinational firms have acquired. These assets are internationally mobile, but subject to the adoption costs represented by equation (2). The equilbrium rate of retu to nominal investment, e.g., the return to savings made available to the investors, must be equal to the world interest rate in this setting. The driving force for Fni is investment in location-specific assets. Theyare complementar to owner-specific assets such that changes in the stock of locationspecific assets wil result in inflows or outflows of owner-specific assets.
Production of final goods is assumed to be perfectly competitive, and consumers are assumed to have homothetic preferences. Then final output produced by firms can be aggregated into one composite consumption good, while the individual firms' constant returns to scale production function can be aggregated into one macro production function. The subscriptj can be omitted from the production fuction (5). Combining 
where 1 = .lal(l-a). We have split the location-specific asset into two entres in the production function; a direct input in the production of final goods and an indirect contrbution that works through adoption costs. Individual investors do not take the latter into account when making investment decisions in a market economy, and the distinction is useful when the steady state growth path of the economy is derived.
Note that the macro production fuction exhibits increasing tetus to scale in L, G and K. The quality parameters constitute a geometrical series. The production function can therefore be wrtten as:
In this macroeconomic setting, the qualityparameters can have the same interpretation as they had in section 2.1, representing different types of assets that are employed by all firms, and which can be ranedaccording to quality or productivity. An alternative interpretation is to see the aggregate consumer good as composed of a number of goods and services from an equal number of industries. Industres are raned according to how sophisticated their technology is, and each technology matches a quality rong of owner-specific assets. As wil be shown below, this interpretation has some interesting implications.
Factor income is consumed or saved according to consumers' utility maximization problem. Infinitely lived households maximize the standard constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution utility function:
u(e) = f. e-Ødt t 1-8
where e is consumption per household, p is the time preference rate and 8 is the, elasticity of marginal utility.
To make the analysis tractable, we assume that the constraint on capital mobility is binding such that all owner-specific assetsare provided from foreign savings. The accumulation of location-specific assets, or theeconomy's budget constraint is then
given by:
The share of factor income that accroe to foreign investors, a., is subtracted from total factor income. Let us now assume that each household supply one unit of labor inelastically and households can be represented by one representative worker who also provides savings for investment in location-specific assets. Finally, assume that the specific assets to accumulated stock of location-specific assets equals their relative share in total factor income. In the following we wil assume that the depreciation rate is the same for both types of assets. Then we can use the condition that the g/ko = ¡I a, and the Euler equation yields the growth path of the economy:
The model yields endogenous growth iff Y(1_a)i--a(1-1: aJa )o iS + p. Note that
1-Â y
there is no scale effect. The growth rate is higher the small er is the adoption cost parameter 't, the larger is the number ofblueprints n, available to the economy and the larger is Â. It can be shown that in steady state the rate of growth of per capita consumption, output and the nominal capital stock is the same, see Barro and Sala-iMarin (1995) . Thus, in steady state, the flow of nominal FDI is a function of the growth rate of the economy, while the accumulated stock is a function of the stock of location-specific assets. Since individual investors do not take the externality into account, the market solution is most likely suboptimal. In order to obtain the optimal growth rate of the economy, we turn to a social planner who takes the externality into account when investment decisÌons are being made.
The socially optimal growth rate
In this section we derve the socially optimal growth rate for an economy open to international capital flows. We maintain the assumption that the constraint on international capital flows is binding such that all investment in owner-specific capital is financed from abroad. Given the natue of location-specific assets, it is reasonable to assume that govemments are involved in such investments either through public investment or subsidized private investment. The local Ìnvestor is therefore 
The socially optimum growth rate is higher than the market solution, since
(1-a)2 :; 1(1-a) requires that 1 -a -1:; O, which is always the case. This implies, as usual in this kind of growth models, that there is room for policy measures that improve growth performance compared to the market solution. We turn to such policy measures in section 3. But before we go into a policy discussion, let us recapture the findings on Fni in countries that are poor in location-specific assets.
In section 2 where we looked at investment decisions in a static setting, we found that investments in owner-specific assets in a particular location increases with the stock oflocation-specific assets. Further, the wedge between thenominal and the effective investment is wider the small er the stock of location-specific assets per capita and the more sophisticated the asset. Applying equations (3) and (4), it turns out that the marginal product of the nominal and effective stock of each rung of owner-specific assets are related as follows:
The rate of return to the effective capital stock is thus above the world market interest rate in capital-poor countres. Condition (14) reconciles our model with the observation that the return to savings do es not differ much between countries in spite of the fact that developing countres are relatively poor in capitaL. In other worlds, the return to savings are not higher in capital-poor countres, but the returns to installed, productive capital is higher, as predicted by the neoclassical growth modeL. Since it is the rate of return to savings that matters to the international investor, capital wil only trckle to poor countres if poor countres are also poor in location-specific assets.
Neverheless, from equations (12) and (13) . This does, however imply that poor countres wil not catch up.
Policy implications and some empirical evidence
In the absence of a social planner, thegovemment can introduce a subsidy in the market solution and thereby replicate the socially optimal solution. It can easily be shown that the adequate subsidy must be levied on investment in location-specific capital at the rate (1-a)/y. Policies for higher growth should in other words be directed towards stimulating the accumulation of location-specific assets, rather than designing investment incentives for foreign investors. When poor countres compete for Fni, this conclusion is reinforced. In such a situation investment incentives for foreign investors in the form of tax holidays and subsidies could lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of resources available for domestic development. Investment in location-specific assets on the other hand, induces Fni and a "race to the top," since investors are attracted by assets that are often valuable in their own right in this case.
To summarize the findings of ths paper, we have found that countres that are poor in location-specific assets have a low return to Fni and therefore receive meager inflows of Fnl. Further, we have seen that the composition of Fni in terms of the quality of owner-specific assets are similar in rich and poor countries, but the wedge between nominal and effective investment is higher in poor countres, and more so the more sophisticated the assets. Finally, we have seen that the growth rate of the stock of Fni is similar in rich and poor countries.
If we interpret the macro production fuction as an aggregate of industries that can be , raned according to how sophisticated the assets employed in the production process, then our findings imply that the relative price ofgoods and services produced by hightechnology industries are paricularly high in developing countres. The shares for Thai industries add up to more than a 100 percent due to significant 6 1998 saw a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the oil and gas sector as a result of restrcturig in that sector. 1998 is therefore somewhat biased due to some mega-deals in this sector.
